Pan Africanism : Chinese create unease in Afrika

I-khan said:
CHINA IS ACTING OUT OF CHINA'S INTEREST.PLAIN AND SIMPLE.THEY MAY HAVE BEEN SUPPORTIVE IN THE PAST BUT TODAY THEY GET WHAT THEY WANT BY ANY MEANS.COVERT OR OTHERWISE.

You think they are gonna hold hands with us and sing Negro Spirituals?
China is Communist,which means they have some different methods, they may have more "unknown" reasons for supporting various revolutionary factions in Afrika so the Chinese can make their own imperialistic gain but using different methods.


Behind the UN Security Council Resolution: Chinese, Russian and Indian Oil interests in the Sudan
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=ZYG20040919&articleId=612


In essensce Afrika should look to Afrika and their are some positive notes in the article below,BUT it could be that these things that may be deemed positive are new methods of imperialism with a Communist mask.In the end,the continent is still being stolen from,whether by political means or otherwise.
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China in Africa - the new imperialism?
Stephen Marks (2006-03-02)

From oil fields in Sudan to farms in Zimbabwe, China’s
presence in Africa can be seen and felt everywhere. In
recent times, writes Stephen Marks, China’s
relationship with Africa has shifted from Cold War
ideology to a more classical pursuit of economic
self-interest. But its not all negative – as the
global economic giant bulges, opportunities also arise
for Africa.


China’s increased presence in Africa is part of a
wider effort to ‘create a paradigm of globalisation
that favours China’ [1]. In the past China’s African
presence benefited from a shared history as an object
of European imperialism and its ideological commitment
to anti-imperialism and national liberation. China’s
declared principles of respect for national
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs
appealed not only as a contrast with the suspect
motives of former colonial powers, but for less
elevated reasons to rulers threatened with internal
dissent.

But more recently China’s policy has shifted from Cold
War ideology to a more classical pursuit of economic
self-interest in the form of access to raw materials,
markets and spheres of influence through investment,
trade and military assistance - to the point where
China can be suspected of pursuing the goals of any
classical imperialist.

The new orientation found institutional expression in
the first China-Africa Co-operation Forum held in
Beijing in 2000 - a mechanism to promote diplomatic
relations, trade and investment between China and
African countries. In the same year, China-Africa
trade passed $10bn for first time [1]. By 2003 it
reached $18.5bn. According to some estimates it is on
course to reach $30bn this year [2]. More recent
Chinese estimates claim that it is already approaching
$40bn [3].

By 2004, nearly 700 Chinese companies were operating
in 49 African countries [4]. The December 2003 Forum
in Addis Ababa, attended by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, attracted 250
African businessmen and 150 from China.

The earlier ‘ideological’ phase of Chinese-African
relations was part of a global strategy which by the
mid-70s saw some 15,000 doctors and over 10,000
agricultural engineers from China serving all over the
‘third world’. In Africa China undertook ambitious
infrastructure projects such as the Tanzam railway
between Tanzania and Zambia, in parallel with a
Western-financed road system. Chinese influence was
also promoted through provision of technical
expertise, doctors, scholarships and aid. Today over
900 Chinese doctors still work in African countries
[5]. Military assistance was concentrated on
ideological allies [including at different times
Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia]. By 1977 trade
with Africa reached a record $817m [6].

China’s aid policy

There are areas of continuity with earlier Chinese
policy however. Low-interest loans have been extended
at non-commercial rates, and leveraged a second time
or forgiven at China-Africa Cooperation Forums -
earning China diplomatic support at the UN [eg over
Taiwan].

Chinese medical, agricultural and engineering teams
continue to operate in many African countries.
‘Since 1963, some 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked
in 47 African states treating nearly 180 million cases
of HIV/AIDS. At the end of 2003, 940 Chinese doctors
were still working throughout the continent. Beijing
prefers technical support over financial aid to
African countries for obvious reasons. Financial aid
stretches resources and diverts capital from
significant needs at home, therefore investments in
trade and projects that have a chance at providing
returns are more popular than direct aid and loan
programs.’ [1]

The continued emphasis on educational opportunities
and the provision of expert assistance helps in
identifying China as a paradigm of ‘soft power’. But
the 15,000 African students who have studied in China
since independence [6] have obviously brought China
some commercial as well as political returns.

China’s economic role

‘Almost every African country today bears examples of
China's emerging presence, from oil fields in the
east, to farms in the south, and mines in the center
of the continent. According to a recent Reuters
report, Chinese-run farms in Zambia supply the
vegetables sold in Lusaka's street markets, and
Chinese companies - in addition to launching Nigerian
satellites - have a virtual monopoly on the
construction business in Botswana’. [2]

‘The 674 Chinese state companies involved in Africa
have invested not only in booming sectors such as
mines, fishing, precious woods and telecommunications,
but also in others that the West has neglected, even
abandoned, as less profitable. As a result, Zambia’s
Chambezi copper mines are being worked again and
supposedly exhausted oil reserves in Gabon are being
explored. In 2004 Chinese investments represented more
than $900m of the $15bn of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Africa. Of the thousands of projects under
way, 500 are being exclusively directed by the China
Road and Bridge Corporation, a state enterprise,
helping to place 43 Chinese companies among the 225
global leaders in the area. In Ethiopia China is
involved in telecommunications; in the Democratic
Republic of Congo it has done work for Gecamine, the
state-owned mining company; in Kenya it has repaired
the road linking Mombasa and Nairobi; and it has
launched Nigeria’s first space satellite. As an
incentive to Chinese nationals, eight African
countries have been officially designated tourist
destinations.’ [6]

For China, Africa represents:

- A key source of raw materials, especially crude oil
of which China is now the world’s second largest
consumer, with over 25% of its oil imports coming from
Sudan and the Gulf of Guinea [6].

According to Chinese Customs figures reported by the
BBC in January 2006, in the first 10 months of 2005
trade between China and Africa rose by 39% to over
$32bn, largely fuelled by imports of African oil,
mainly from Sudan. According to the US Energy
Information Administration [EIA] China accounted for
over 40% of the total growth in global oil demand over
the past four years. [7]

- A market for cheap Chinese-made products.

- Opportunities for investment in infrastructure
[hydro-electric plants, pipelines, factories,
hospitals]
especially in potential markets where western firms
are deterred by political considerations such as
sanctions or political instability.

Indeed, where Western firms may be deterred by
domestic pressures from NGO’s or by the impact on
corporate image of a connection with repressive or
corrupt regimes, China benefits by a ‘double whammy’ -
its freedom from such pressures makes it a more
attractive partner for some regimes, and the absence
of competition from Western multinationals creates the
possibility of larger profits. [1]

Sudan

‘China, through the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), is the most visible and
significant investor in Sudanese oil exploration,
transportation and production infrastructure. These
investments enabled Sudan to begin exporting oil in
1999 and eventually become a net oil exporter. Though
Sudan's current production capacity of 310,000 barrels
per day (bpd) is relatively insignificant compared to
the global production of approximately 82 million bpd,
its product is of a high quality. Such so-called
"light-sweet crude" is in short supply in global
markets, and sells at a premium over Middle Eastern
crude which has a higher sulphur content. China's
investment in Sudanese oil production capacity has
resulted in Sudan's output now amounting to five
percent of China's total imports. Significantly, China
is Sudan's single largest customer of oil, taking over
half of Sudan's exports in 2003.’ [1]

Though China won its original oil exploitation bid in
Sudan in 1995, it was Washington’s decision to cut
ties two years later which gave China its opportunity
to step in. While Washington still maintains partial
oil sanctions against Sudan, China has become Sudan’s
biggest trading partner, taking 60% of the country’s
oil exports, amounting to 9 per cent of China’s total
oil needs.

“We started in Sudan from scratch” said Li Xiaobing, a
Chinese Trade Ministry deputy director dealing with
Africa. “When we started there, they were an oil
importer, and now they are an oil exporter. We've
built refineries, pipelines and production." He
dismissed a question about Sudan's human rights
record, saying, "We import from every source we can
get oil from." [8].

In return China has used the threat of its Security
Council veto to stall or dilute resolutions on Darfur.
According to China’s assistant Foreign Minister Zhou
Wenzhong: “I think the internal situation in the Sudan
is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to
impose upon them.”

This combination of infrastructure investment, trade
and political support at the UN constitutes what has
been called a ‘complete package’[5].

The favour is reciprocated. According to Awad al-Jaz,
Sudan’s Energy and Mining Minister, “the Chinese are
very nice. They don’t have anything to do with
politics or problems. Things move smoothly,
successfully”[5].

Angola

China’s ability to offer a complete package free of
extra-commercial conditionality is also illustrated by
Angola, now China’s second-largest trading partner in
Africa, which buys 25% of its oil production.[6]

At the end of 2004 the Chinese export bank Eximbank
approved a $2bn credit for rebuilding infrastructure
destroyed in the civil war. In return China would
receive 10,000 barrels of oil a day.

The line of credit - at 1.5% over 17 years - might
look disadvantageous to China in the short term, but
Chinese companies will secure the lion’s share of
lucrative contracts for national reconstruction. Local
people are unhappy. As independent economist José
Cerqueira pointed out: “There is a condition in the
loan that 30% will be subcontracted to Angolan firms,
but that still leaves 70% which will not. Angolan
businessmen are very worried about this, because they
don’t get the business, and the construction sector is
one in which Angolans hope they can find work.” [6]

The availability of the Chinese loan is believed to
have encouraged Angola to resist pressure from the IMF
and Western countries to improve the transparency of
its oil sector and make other reforms in what has been
described as Africa’s most corrupt country. A planned
donors’ conference was postponed in mid-2005. But
China’s ambassador to South Africa described the
pressure for transparency as a condition of the
conference as ‘uncalled for’. [5]

Nonetheless Angola was to see a rare example of China
intervening to ensure that its assistance was not put
to improper use. On 9 December 2004 Chinese pressure
forced the business go-between Antonio Pereira Mendes
de Campos Van Dunem to resign from his post as
secretary of the Angolan council of ministers after
the British watchdog on transparency, Global Witness,
announced that the money was in danger of being
diverted to other uses. Some of the money went to fund
government propaganda for the 2006 general election
[6].

Despite this diversion, the line of credit has also
made possible the funding of railroad repair, road
building, office construction, and a fiber-optic
network [9].

Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, China has also taken the opportunity
provided by Western disengagement and pressure for
change, to offer itself as an alternative source of
no-strings assistance and investment. As part of what
Robert Mugabe calls his ‘look East’ policy, China
delivered 12 fighter jets and 100 trucks to Zimbabwe’s
army when the country was subject to a western arms
embargo [10].

In 2004 a delegation of 100 Chinese businessmen headed
by Wu Bangguo, chair of China’s legislature, agreed
joint venture deals in mining, transportation,
communications and energy. [2] In addition, China was
reported to have sent crates of T-shirts for
supporters of the ruling party in the 2005 elections,
and provided a radio jamming device located at a
military base outside the capital to prevent
independent radio stations from broadcasting during
the election campaign.

China was also reported to have designed Robert
Mugabe’s new 25-bedroomed $9m mansion, and donated its
special cobalt-blue slate roof tiles. [10] In the
words of Emerson Mnangagwa, speaker of Zimbabwe’s
Parliament: “With all-weather friends like the Peoples
Republic of China...Zimbabwe will never walk alone.”

Sierra Leone

A football stadium in Freetown, originally donated by
China in the 1970s, in the earlier, ideological phase
of China’s relations with Africa, has now been joined
by a Chinese-built government office block, parliament
building and military headquarters. Chinese firms have
also invested in a sugar plant, a tractor factory and
an industrial complex, as well as renovating and
managing the biggest hotel.

"We like Chinese investment because we have one
meeting, we discuss what they want to do, and then
they just do it," Sahr Johnny, Sierra Leone's
ambassador to Beijing, told the BBC’s Lindsey Hilsum.
"There are no benchmarks and preconditions, no
environmental impact assessment. If a G8 country had
offered to rebuild the stadium, we'd still be having
meetings about it."

But Hilsum found that this was precisely what worried
local anti-corruption campaigners, among them Zainab
Bangura of Sierra Leone's National Accountability
Group. "We've spent 15 years working on conventions
against corruption, and now the Chinese come in and
they haven't signed up to any of it. They're secretive
and they only deal with governments - they don't
consult civil society or anyone. I'm worried that
African governments will see China as an alternative
to G8 countries, because with the Chinese they don't
have to worry about good governance and all that."
[4].

China - the new imperialist?

Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of the South African
Institute of International Affairs, has called the
trade relations between South Africa and China "a
replay of the old story of South Africa's trade with
Europe."

While admitting the benefits of trade, he points out
that exports from China and Hong Kong to his country
are double those from Africa and almost double what
South Africa exports to China. "We sell them raw
materials and they sell us manufactured goods with a
predictable result - an unfavourable trade balance
against South Africa."[2]

In a classic re-run of the trade relations established
by European imperialism, South Africa, like other
African states, exports raw materials to China while
importing cheap Chinese products which compete with,
and undercut, local industries. The South African
trade union federation COSATU has called for
restriction of Chinese imports and has urged retailers
to stock a minimum of 75% of locally made goods. [4].

South African campaigners can point to Chinese exports
of textiles to South Africa, which grew from 40% of
clothing exports to 80% by the end of 2004. But local
industry also suffers from the growth of low-cost
Chinese exports to the USA and Europe, which cuts off
prospective African exports in those markets. This
effect has been particularly aggravated since the end
of the Multi-Fibre Agreement [MFA] . ‘Once the MFA
expired in January 2005, however, Chinese exports to
the United States soared and African exporters found
they could not compete. More than 10 clothing
factories in Lesotho closed in 2005, throwing at least
10,000 employees out of work. South Africa’s clothing
exports to the United States dropped from $26 million
in the first quarter of 2004 to $12 million for the
first quarter of 2005.’ [5]

In October 2005 trade union representatives from the
clothing, textiles, footwear and leather sector from
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia,
Tanzania, Nigeria, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia,
Zimbabwe and South Africa met in Cape Town to discuss
the effects of the phasing-out of the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement (MFA). They concluded that the African
continent has lost more than 250 000 jobs over the
past few years, as cheap textiles and clothing imports
from China have flooded the domestic African markets.
[11]

They called for African governments to impose
temporary safeguard measures allowed under China’s
accession to the WTO which provide for limitations of
7.5% on China’s percentage of the domestic market
until 2008. The USA and EU have already concluded such
limitation agreements which will have had a beneficial
knock-on effect on African producers, by slowing down
the pace at which Chinese exports to the USA and EU
can displace African exports.

In the words of the Eurpean Commission, their
agreement ‘also provides a window for adaptation for
producers in developing countries whose textile
exports to the EU were being displaced by a surge in
imports from China’. [12]

Perhaps in anticipation of such a quota being imposed,
China’s ambassador to South Africa recently announced
that China will ‘voluntarily limit the export of
garments and some textile items to South Africa’ [13].
SA officials confirmed that talks were still
continuing, and China had offered to help with
training in the clothing and textile industries.

The announcement got a cautious welcome from the
industry and from the South African Clothing and
Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) whose members had lost
some 60,000 jobs between January 2003 and November
2005. Industry sources claimed clothing imports from
China had risen 40% in the previous nine months.

In Zambia only 20 local textile factories remain out
of 250 20 years ago, and Chinese competition is blamed
[14] Leonard Hikaumba, president of the Zambian
Congress of Trade Unions, bemoaned what he called the
dumping of cheap textiles and electronics goods by
Chinese exporters. "The beneficiaries of these are the
exporters, not us," he said. [15]

In Nigeria the textile and clothing workers union
estimates some 350,000 jobs have been lost directly
because of Chinese competition and 1.5m indirectly
over the last five years. According to the Union’s
secretary-general,"Most warehouses in Lagos have been
converted to churches because there are no
manufactured goods to warehouse."[15]

The Kenyan clothing industry has also warned of
further job losses as Chinese imports crowd local
producers out of the domestic market as well as the
European market, where quotas on Chinese imports [see
above] are due to be relaxed. Firms in Kenya’s Export
Processing Zone [EPZ] reported at the end of 2005 that
14 factories had closed with the loss of 7000 jobs
since January that year with the remainder operating
at 50% capacity [16].

China’s policy on arms sales has also caused concern.
The Beijing Declaration, adopted at the first
China-African Cooperation Forum in October 2000,
provided that China would co-operate in stopping the
illegal production, circulating and trafficking in
small arms and light weapons in Africa. However
Chinese weapons, even including land mines, have
appeared in Burundi and the Congo, quite apart from
the legal sales of weapons to such regimes as Zimbabwe
and Sudan. Three small-arms factories were said to
have been built by China outside Khartum, whose output
was subsequently found among arms captured by southern
rebels.

The way forward

It would be wrong to suggest that China’s impact only
raises problems, or is merely a re-run of past
imperialisms. The fact that Western corporations and
government now face competition can give African
states more room for manoeuvre, and an alternative to
accepting the dictates of the IMF. Naturally, NGOs,
human rights campaigners and trade unionists have
concentrated on cases where this room for manoeuvre
has been exploited by repressive regimes seeking to
avoid pressure exerted on Western governments to
impose some minimal human rights or environmental
conditions. But that does not mean that the ‘Chinese
option’ could not also be exploited to widen the room
for all African states, not only those abusing human
rights.

In this respect, China’s willingness to advance a loan
to Angola regardless of IMF conditions could prove a
beneficial precedent in other cases. And China’s
willingness to invest in sectors which Western
investors have neglected, such as cotton production in
Zambia, should be welcomed even if China sees them as
‘loss-leaders’ for more directly self-interested
involvement.

Indeed at least one US Africanist has sketched out an
optimistic [some might say utopian] scenario in which
the USA and China co-operate on a programme to further
human rights and sustainable development in Africa as
in the long-term interests of both.

‘The question then is does China want to be seen in
Africa as the defender of rogue states, the more
aggressive seeker of Africa’s natural resources,
without regard to transparency, development and
stability there? Is there room for developing some
rules of the road, some common objectives, some ways
in which Chinese economic gains for Africa (and
itself) can come side by side with building more
stability and democracy there? Are there incentives –
more joint ventures, more common work on both the
exploitation and preservation of natural resources in
Africa (e.g., the rain forests) – that the United
States can offer? In sum, are there more areas of
win-win situations in Africa for both the United
States and China? It is better to explore these
possibilities than to start down the path of trying to
limit Chinese influence, for the odds are against that
happening any time soon.’ [5]

However remote the prospect of these counsels proving
acceptable in the corridors of power in Washington and
Beijing, African civil society needs to consider how
to react to China’s challenge which avoids uncritical
acceptance on the one hand or mere rejectionism on the
other. There are lessons to be learnt from the
experience of other nations in the ‘majority world’ in
engaging with China’s economic dynamism in ways which
turn a problem into an opportunity, and encourage the
emergence of what Chris Alden has called ‘an Africa
that can say no’ [17].

Regimes stigmatised in the West as ‘rogue states’,
often with good reason, will not be willing or able to
insist on much conditionality in return for a Chinese
lifeline. But that should not prevent African civil
society from researching and advancing a package of
measures which could be put forward as a necessary
conditional component of Chinese investment packages.
These could include training prorammes, technology
transfer, the fostering of local management skills,
and the reservation of a proportion of Chinese
investment and infrastructure projects for local firms
and labour.

The experience of a number of Latin American states
may provide a model here. Brazil, Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela have all experienced increased Chinese trade
and investment but have combined this with positive
trade balances, due in part to bilateral agreements
giving preferential access for key sectors or
products.

Most recently, Brazil and China have agreed that China
will set quotas for eight types of Chinese textile
exports to Brazil, according to the Brazilian Trade
Ministry's Web site. The products account for 60
percent of Brazil's textile imports [18]. Further
research and exchange of information would show how
much of the Latin American experience could be
generalised to provide policy conclusions applicable
in an African context.

Recent signs that China may be considering similar
quotas for South Africa are encouraging, as is the
accompanying talk of assistance for retraining and
restructuring. But it is not unduly cynical to see
such initiatives as an attempt to forestall stronger
measures. A more comprehensive package, negotiated
Africa-wide, is needed; especially since quota
agreements under the WTO will expire in 2008, and are
in any case open to abuse by ‘quota hopping’. [12]

Further work could also indicate the potential for
integrating into a single package, as Alden has
suggested, such issues as:

- Building on China’s existing commitment to bilateral
debt write-offs;
- Raising China’s dumping practices before the WTO’s
dispute machinery; or tying Chinese action on this and
other trade issues to further raw material agreements;
- Promoting gains for local consumers and the local
economy in all trade and investment deals;
- Building on China’s existing commitment to AU
peace-keeping in Darfur, and on the commitment in the
2000 Beijing Declaration to control illegal arms
sales; and seeking to extend the commitment to more
responsible regulation of China’s own lawful arms
sales.

Research is also needed into the feasibility of the
suggestion that the existing China-African Cooperation
Forum be used as the institutional forum for such a
process, with an agreed code of conduct reinforced by
an annual review process, and even a parallel civil
society forum, similar to hat introduced at South
Africa’s suggestion into the Non-Aligned Movement’s
summits.

A closer study of China’s own policy-making processes
and the development of Chinese thinking might indicate
if the prospect of China accepting and participating
in such a process is more than merely utopian. As
Chris Alden concludes:

‘While stability is recognised to be a prerequisite
for development, the proximity of Beijing or its
parastatals to African governments that systematically
abuse rights of its citizens only compromises the
achievement of this long-term aim. After all, China
need only hearken back to its own experience of
decades of banditry before 1949 to recognise the
devastating effects that externally fostered conflict
can have upon society and the prospects for economic
development.’

* Send comments to editor@pambazuka.org

* Stephen Marks is a freelance writer and researcher
specialising in
development and human rights issues.

References

[1] Economic growth and soft power: China’s Africa
Strategy
Drew Thompson
http://www.jamestown.org/print_frien...cle_id=2368982

[2] China’s African Safari
Paul Mooney
YaleGlobal, 3 January 2005
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=5106

[3] New highlights in China-Africa comprehensive
cooperation
http://english.people.com.cn/200601/...14_235306.html

[4] The Chinese are coming
Lindsey Hilsum
New Statesman
4 July 2005
http://www.newstatesman.com/200507040007

[5] China’s Rising Role in Africa: Presentation to the
US-China Commission
Princeton N. Lyman
July 21, 2005
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8436/...in_africa.html

[6] China’s trade safari in Africa
Le Monde Diplomatique
May 2005
Jean Christophe Servant
http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica

[7] China-Africa trade jumps by 39%
BBC News 6 January 2006
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pag...ss/4587374.stm

[8] China in Africa: all trade with no political
baggage
New York Times, August 8 2004
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/...ricantrade.htm

[9] Boston Globe 24 December 2005
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asi... tate?mode=PF

[10] A rising China counters US clout in Africa
Abraham McLaughlin
Christian Science Monitor March 30 2005
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0330/p01s01-woaf.html

[11] http://www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=29776

[12] The Emperor's New Clothing Deals
Business Day (Johannesburg)
February 21, 2006
http://allafrica.com/stories/printab...602210354.html

[13] Textiles: China Voluntarily Cuts Back Exports to
South Africa
20-01-06
http://www.agoa.info/news.php?story=629

[14]
http://www.panos.org.uk/global/tradi...s_feature2.asp

[15] ‘Tsunami of cheap goods’ overwhelm African jobs
Reuters, 20-12-05
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/category/p...ectid=10360687

[16]
http://www.textileandapparel.com/sto...1/22/202435/17

[17] Leveraging the Dragon: Toward "An Africa That Can
Say No"
Chris Alden
eAfrica, 1 March 2005
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5336

[18] Domestic textile exports to face quotas in Brazil
China Economic Net 13 Feb 2006
http://en-1.ce.cn/Business/Macro-eco..._6065807.shtml

http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/32432


LOL!

So now you resort to "red bashing" while quoting sources such as the reactonary, arch conservative Christian Science Monitor!?

LOL! :terrific:

Wow....!

I really would like to see you folks get together, go back to afrika and see How many allies among afrikans that you would have spouting this counter-revolutionary rhetoric.....and then talk about killing collaborators....LOL!!

most afrikans would look at YOU as if YOu are 'the enemy" especially coming from amerikkka expousing this GARBAGE!!
 
jamesfrmphilly said:
earthworm? earthworm?

if you can calm down enough to read my post you will note that i said we all need to speak more respectfully toward each other.
let's try that.

Earthworm is one of Blacklioness's quotes.

But if I want to say I will not be treated like an earthworm, again, I have that right thank you. I do have the ability to associate things with nature if I wish.
 
jamesfrmphilly said:
earthworm? earthworm?

if you can calm down enough to read my post you will note that i said we all need to speak more respectfully toward each other.
let's try that.

Earthworm is one of Blacklioness's quotes.

But if I want to say I will not be treated like an earthworm, again, I have that right thank you. I do have the ability to associate things with nature if I wish.

And since earthworm seems to be causing so much 'confusion' I will say something ON MY OWN... I will not be treated as a fly on the wall. Is that clear and original enough?
 
panafrica said:
Omowalejabali:

The proof is in the pudding, is your stance that Africa is in a better position today? That the continent is progressing in a positive direction? Tell me in your opinion what has stagnated African progress: Incompetent black people who can not possible do anything without help from the outside? Only with such a stance can you effectively discount my position. If you remove your nose for a history book (everything you've read I have read also) and take a look at the current state social-economic state of Africa, neither you nor anyone else can portray or pretend coalitions with non-blacks has helped Africa in the long run. The true key to learning from history is not to "hero worship" and mimick; but to see what occured, then study, evolve and adapt to current circumstances. In order words to repeat what was effective, and changed what failed to bring results. All the African independence movement achieved was to give African nations an illusion of freedom with political rights, but no economic control; as well as the establishment of puppet governments loyal to the non-blacks who supposedly helped them instead of the people themselves. Seeking the help of non blacks in a majority black populated continent (with all the resources needed to sustain itself), is akin to cutting off your legs to escape a trap: "You might free yourself, but ultimately you'll not be able to walk on your own". However your welcome to provide more examples of how Africa needs non-blacks, and how the black man can't conceivably do anything for self....how ideals like the United States of Africa can never happen.


Yes it is my stance that Afrika is in a better position today than it was in 1992 and has moved forward since the abOlishment of the apartheid states in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the defeat of rebel forces in Angola and Mozambique and Namibia.

"Seeking the help of non blacks in a majorty black populated continent (with all the resources needed to sustain itself) is akin to cutting off your legs to escape a trap"...

If you say so. Perhaps you would be more effective devising a plan and submitting that to the Afrikan leadership on the continent instead of daily sitting in an internet chat room....lol!

As far as the "black man doing for self" NEVER at any point have I said that Afrikans, ON THE CONTINENT "cant" do for self, but the reality is

AFRICA IS A MULTI-RACIAL CONTINENT!

AFRICA IS NOT ONLY INHABITED BY "BLACK" PEOPLE!


DONT BELIEVE ME, GO TO SOUTH AFRICA AND PRESENT YOUR PLAN TO THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS!!
 

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