Most people, I think, would respond 'yes' but think before you do. I'm using 'pleasure' interchangeably with 'happiness' as an umbrella term for all positive, desirable emotions (sexual pleasure, love, the pleasure that comes from good music, food, video games etc.). If you argue that some pleasures are intrinsically 'higher' than other pleasures, like John Stuart Mill did, you have to base this distinction on something other than the pleasurable-ness of pleasure (since saying that one form of pleasure is more pleasurable than another is like saying one shade of blue is more blue than another, there are quantitative degrees of blueness but all shades of blue are equally blue). You might consider some pleasures to be more 'noble' or 'appropriate' than others but can any be considered more pleasurable? Intuitively I feel that some pleasures are 'higher' than others but I'm not sure if this can be logically defended. There's no doubt in my mind that the pleasurable-ness of love and feeling connected to others is more intense and durable than the pleasurable-ness of food (and probably necessarily so) but I can't see how it can be considered qualitatively better. If it was somehow possible to feel love that wasn't pleasurable, why would it be 'good' to feel that love, if it wasn't a pleasurable feeling?